The materialist concept of history starts from the principle that production, and with production the exchange of its products, is the basis of every social order; that in every society which has appeared in history the distribution of the products, and with it the division of society into classes or estates, is determined by what is produced and how it is produced, and how the product is exchanged. According to this conception, the ultimate causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in the minds of men, in their increasing insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the mode of production and exchange; they are to be sought not in the philosophy but in the economics of the epoch concerned.3
Certainly Marx was interested in explicating the forms of social existence in terms of the modes of production and exchange prev alent within those forms, but it is not clear in what sense the modes of production and exchange can be said to be the ultimate causes of social and political change. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that Marx would agree that the causes of social change are to be found in the economics of an epoch to the exclusion of the philosophy. Instead he would insist that the philosophy and economics of an epoch cannot be divorced from one another.
A corrective to Engel's 'scientific' conception of historical materialism is provided by Plekhanov. Plekhanov, emphasizing the Feuerbachian aspects of Marx's writings, came up with a more plausible Marx in spite of not having access to the early writings. Taking from Feuerbach and Engels the claim that "it is not thinking that determines being, but being that determines thinking,"^ Plekhanov emphasized that the being of man is social and historical. Idealism took as its point of departure the abstract "I." As a result an unbridgeable gulf was created between the subject and object. Materialism, in order to over come this gulf, begins not with the abstract "I," but with the subject which is at the same time an object. "I am an actual being; my body belongs to my essence ; moreover, my body, as a whole, is my I, my genuine essence. It is not an abstract being that thinks, but this actual being, this body."5 Plekhanov notes Marx's critique of Feuerbach for having made man the passive recipient of the action of the material world upon the human organism,® but he still succumbs to the tempta tion of interpreting Marx's materialism in terms of a physio logical analysis of the human organism.7
While Plekhanov attempts to hold on to both a view of man as activity and a reduction of consciousness to physiological processes, Lenin loses grasp of the active nature of man altogether. He casts the opposition between idealism and materialism into purely Cartesian terms.
The materialist elimination of the "dualism of spirit and body" (i.e. materialist monism) consists in the assertion that the spirit does not exist independently of the body, that spirit is secondary, a function of the brain, a reflection of the external world. The idealist elimination of the "dualism of spirit and body" (i.e. idealist monism) consists in the asser tion that spirit is not a function of the body, that consequently, spirit is primary, that the "environment" and the "self" exist only in an inseparable connection of one and the same "complexes of elements."® The active role of man toward nature seems to play no part in Lenin's epistemology. Man's knowledge of the world is under stood in terms of the laws of physics and neurophysiology. "Sensation depends on the brain, nerves, retina, etc., i.e., on matter organized in a definite way. . . . Sensation, thought, consciousness are the supreme product of matter organized in a particular way."9 This is the view Lenin adopts for himself and attributes to Marx.
Of the classical Marxists, Bukharin is perhaps the most straightforward in casting the issues between idealism and materialism into Cartesian terms. For him it is "the question as the relation between matter and mind, which in simple parlance is often spoken of as the relation between 'soul' and 'body'."10 Whatever matter is then, it is not res extensa, the matterin-motion discussed by Descartes or the early Marxists. Nature is not a realm describable totally in terms of a physics which abstracts from the world only those properties of things which have no reference to human qualities. The question before us now is whether there is a concept of matter which is consistent with recent criticisms of classical Marxism and can serve as the metaphysical foundation for the social and political claims made by Marx. There is, I think, such a concept and it is to be found in Aristotle.
In the central books of the Metaphysics, Zeta, Eta, and Theta, Aristotle investigates the nature of sensible substance. The form of sensible substance is both its shape and that by means of which it is knowable. It also makes the sensible a determinate something. The matter is that out of which a thing is made. It may be the matter for something (the acorn is the matter for the oak), or it may be the matter of something (the brick is the matter of the house). The term Matter," for Aristotle, primarily refers to something in a particular stage of a dynamic process. It refers to brick and acorns only in so far as they can be considered as part of some process of becoming.
In the initial discussion, Aristotle asks whether substance is form, matter, or composite. It cannot be form, for form is always a 'such' and never a 'this*. Substance must be a determinate something. Substance cannot be matter, for matter is, without form, indeterminate. And he dismisses the composite since it is posterior to both form and matter. In dismissing the composite of form and matter as substance, Aristotle is considering the form and the matter as separable parts of a whole. Considered in this way, the composite is posterior since its form and its matter are necessary conditions for its having come to be in the first place.
Later Aristotle argues that substance is the composite, but form and matter are not parts of something. At this point, however, he is setting up the aporia, the problem or difficulty which gives rise to the philosophical discussion which follows. This aporia or problem is significant for understanding the issues between Marx and the German idealists because it shifts the problem from one of sufficiency of a single principle to one of priority among principles which are jointly and onlŷ Merleau-Ponty, "Marxism and Philosophy," in Sense and Non-Sense.
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jointly sufficient. While neither material principles nor formal principles alone are sufficient principles of substance, one may in some yet unspecified sense be prior to the other.
Form and matter are not only principles of substance, but also causes, along with the efficient cause (that by the operation of which a thing comes to be what it is), and the final cause (the end or 'for which' the thing comes to be what it is). An important insight into the nature of substance emerges due to the applicability of Aristotle's model of causality to substance. Ordinarily we think of causality as being applicable, not to things, but to events. A causal account is generally of the form, "If event A occurs, it will be followed by event B" or "Event B occurred due to the previous occurrence of event A." Aristotle has no difficulty with these more common causal accounts. What is interesting, though, is the suggestion that substance has an eventful character to it. A thing, a compos ite of form and matter, is not just a piece of inert matter in a particular shape. Things, all things, have a natural history. They come to be and they perish. Between times they endure. While they endure, many accidental things may happen to them, but there is something essential about their coming to be.
At this point another thread weaves its way into the Aristotelian analysis. Sensible substances are things which come to be; that is, they are generated. That which is gener ated is a substance and that out of which it is generated, its matter, was a potentiality for the thing's having come to be. If it is the case that those things which are generated are substances, then the composite, not the form or the matter, is substance. When one makes a bronze statue from a bronze ingot, one does not make the bronze. Of course, one may have pre viously made the ingot from copper and tin, but then what was being made was not the statue but the ingot. Similarly, one does not make the form or shape when one makes the statue. "'Form' signifies a such and this is not a this and a definite thing."16 What is made, this bronze statue, is a certain material in a certain shape or form, a composite of form and matter. Only the composite is a definite substance or a something.
Since form is a 'such' and not a 'this', there is no need to take the Platonic step of setting up the forms as separate substances for "that which begets is sufficient to produce and to be the cause of the form in the matter."17 The reason Aristotle can reject the necessity of positing forms as separate from composite entities is that both form and matter pre-exist "^Metaphysics 1033^23. ^Metaphysics 1034a5-6. in other composite entities as necessary preconditions for generation. Generation must be out of something and that some thing exists as a composite.
Let us now consider more closely Aristotle's distinction between actuality and potentiality and how that distinction is related to the one between form and matter. If we consider a given entity, not as entity but as matter, we consider it in its potentiality. This ingot of bronze which we have is potentially a sphere, a statue, a sword, or many other different entities. As matter, it is material for something which it itself is not but could become. As an entity in itself, however, it is this definite and particular bronze ingot. As actuality, it is determinate; as potentiality, it is indeterminate. What could give actuality to one of the potentialities of our bronze ingot? It would have to be given a definite form or shape and there would have to be somebody who had the skill and the motive to shape it. If it were given the form of a sphere, it would be a definite and determinate bronze sphere, actually rather than potentially. It is the form which makes for the actuality of a substance. The power or potentiality for actuality resides in the matter.
What we have, then, is a view of matter which focuses, not on the physical characteristics of weight, mass, and velocity, but on position within the process of becoming. Matter is the dynamic potentiality for the modes of being. That which is is matter for that which will become. It is a concept of matter which has its home, not in modern physical science, but in natural history and, by extension, in human history. 
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A-13 society into two parts--one of which towers above,"
It is interesting to note that while Marx's criticism is here directed against bourgeois society and those philosophies which legiti mate it, it is equally applicable to the materialism of the classical Marxists and to the political practice which was derived from that philosophy.
In order to overcome the deficiencies of the old materialism, Marx must develop a materialism which captures the nature of man as activity and the actuality of man as a social being en gaged in historical praxis. "The essence of man is no abstrac tion inhering in each single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of social relationships."22 The old materialism had taken as its standpoint the civil society which emerged upon the collapse of feudalism. The new materialism must take as its standpoint "human society or socialized humanity."23 The fact is that the state issues from the mass of men existing as members of families and of civil society; but speculative philosophy expresses this fact as an achievement of the Idea, not the idea of the mass, but rather as the deed of an Idea-Subject which is differentiated from the fact itself in such a way that the function assigned to the individual , , . is visibly mediated by circumstances, caprice, etc. Thus empirical actuality is admitted just as it is and is also said to be rational; but not rational because of its own reason, but because the empirical 
fact in its empirical existence has a significance which is other than itself.24
Marx is claiming that it is the mass of individuals who are the substance and subjects, and the state is a historical accident of their subjective life.
The substantiality of the state, according to Hegel, is the educated mind knowing and willing itself. If this mind is taken as substance, then the determinate powers and interests of the state are the concrete modes of its existence, its selfactualization. Because Hegel takes the Idea as subject, however, the actual empirical willing subject becomes the mode and the social structures become the subject and substance. Marx seeks to reverse this ontological relationship so that the empirical subjects are seen as substantive and the social structures as modes of human existence. Where Hegel takes the rationality of the actual as a given, Marx takes it as a problem. The ratio nality of the actual is a matter for investigation, and if the actual proves to be irrational, then it is a task for man to shape the world according to his reason.
In arguing for the substantiality of the state and the dependence of civil society upon the state, Hegel sets up an opposition between the two. As a member of civil society, the individual is private and particular. As an agent of the state, he serves on the basis of his universal and objective qualities. Being a political man and being a private individual does not entail belonging to different ontological spheres. Hegel forgets that particular individuality is a human indi vidual, and that the activities and agencies of the state are human activities. He forgets that the nature of the particular person is not his beard, his blood, his abstract Physis, but rather his social quality, and that the activities of the state, etc., are nothing but the modes of existence and operation of the social qualities of men.25
For Hegel (and unfortunately for many contemporary political commentators) the political office has a life and objectivity of its own independently of the particular private individual who happens to hold it. Marx argues that, to the contrary, to speak of the private individual as someone removed from the political realm is to abstract a certain set of properties from the total which constitutes an actual man. If, as a matter of fact, political man and private man belong to different spheres,^M arx, Critique, p. 9. M a r x , Critique, p. 22.
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that is a reflection of man's historical alienation from himself. Such is the condition of modern man, but to claim substantive actuality for the political office is only to mystify the alien ated condition.
We can now begin to see how Marx's materialism and his concep tion of democracy are related. Social institutions arise out of and remain dependent upon the activity of historical men engaged in social living. By making the activity of historical individ uals determinative of rationality rather than disembodied reason determinative of the concrete forms lived by those individuals, Marx reverses the legitimated authority of the state. To the claim that it is proper to speak of the sovereignty of the people only so far as they form themselves into a state, Marx replies, "As though the people were not the real state. The state is an abstraction; the people alone is concrete."26 in making this move, Marx is shifting attention away from the forms of social and political life to the content of those forms or the matter of which they are determinations. Marx's philosophy is a materialism because it asserts the primacy of the activity of the human species over the historical forms which that activity takes.
Political activity is only one mode of human activity. Democracy has as its basis the entire scope of human existence, while other forms of government, including republicanism, re strict this scope to mere legal form. Here the distinction between idealism and materialism is reflected in the methods used by each. "Hegel proceeds from the state and makes man into the subjectified state; democracy starts with man and makes the state objectified man."27 Marx's method, only foreshadowed in Critique but fully developed in the later writings, is to analyse the social activity of man through which he objectifies himself. Hegel, on the other hand, begins with the logically predetermined Idea and analyses human activity as the incarnation of the Idea. A basic problem for both Hegel and Marx is the unity of form and matter of social existence. Hegel tries to establish this unity by beginning with the form which he sees as determining its content through the historical processes. Marx's alternative is to begin with the content, concrete human exis tence, and to develop a unity by showing how content gives rise to form through the material processes of history.
While Hegel tends to identify democracy with republicanism, Marx is very careful to distinguish the two. All forms of the modern state, including republics as particular forms of govern ment, create a bifurcation of political man and private man. The abstract character of the modern state is two-fold. First, while universal in form, it is only particular in content. That is, it is only one species-form, one means by which man objectifies himself through his activity. As a particular which is universalized, it is abstract alienation. Second, the modern state is dependent upon the abstraction of private life. Private life, and its objectification in private property, produces the system of rights and laws which insure that life. But the rights of property are not the rights of particular, concrete persons. As Marx argues, the rights inhere in the property, and the particular property owner becomes an accident of his prop erty. Marx develops the problem of unity of form and matter in the social and political sphere into the problem of the unity of species-form and species-content. Species-forms are the social institutions through which men objectify themselves. Speciescontent refers to the particular social activities in which men engage. A unity of species-form and species-content arises when the social institutions of a society accurately reflect the varieties of activity engaged in by the members of that society.
Marx
As Marx uses the term 'democracy* in the Critique, it stands for the unity of species-form and species-content. Freedom is not necessarily implied, thus he can refer to Medieval society as the demoetacy of unfreedom. Political struggle can take place either at the level of form or at the level of content, "The struggle between monarchy and republic is itself still a struggle within the abstract form of the state,The republic is the state-form of democracy, but form, contrary to Hegel's view, does not determine content. Thus, Marx points out, "Property, etc., in brief the entire content of law and the state is, with small modification, the same in North America as in Prussia."32 Instead it is content which determines form.
The question of form and content is intimately related to the question of freedom in both Hegel and Marx. Freedom, for Hegel, is realized through the identity of particular will and universal will as exemplified in the state. Freedom was achieved through knowledge. The particular individual was free when he knew that substantive will was the universal will of the state. Content, the will of the individual members of the state, must conform to form, the universal will.
Where Hegel defines freedom in terms of knowledge, Marx defines it in terms of activity. Species-forms arise out of man's species-activities. Family, state, money, products for consumption, all are various objectifications of man. They are ontologically rooted in the free activity of men. Loss of freedom, alienation, occurs when man gives to these forms an independent existence of their own and then allows these forms to determine content. In a free and democratic society, not only will there be a unity of species-form and species-content, but species-content will have a determining relation to speciesform. 
